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Abstract 
HIP-multicast model realizes to manage the group members by introducing the multicast agent (MA). However it 
does not give a data key distribution protocol in which the key is used to encrypt and decrypt multicast data. In this 
paper, a data key distribution protocol applied to HIP-multicast model is proposed according to the characters of the 
model. The proposed protocol adds a multicast key center (MKC) to the model to distribute the data key. It can 
securely distribute the data key and avoid several possible attacks. The proposed protocol can also improve the 
practicability and security of HIP-multicast Model and does not increase too much complexity for the model. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction 
The secure HIP-multicast model [1][2][3] has been proposed for several years, which is also paid close 
attention to by many scholars [4][5][6]. The further research on the model has made some progress [7] [8]. 
However, the model does not give a data key distribution protocol yet, which is used to distribute the key 
of encrypting and decrypting the multicast data. It is necessary to research a data key distribution protocol 
applied to the HIP-multicast model.  
In HIP-multicast model, the multicast agent (MA) plays a key role, and each ISP (Internet Server 
Provider) needs to have a local server as the MA, which is in charge of local management of the multicast 
members, authentication, traffic forward, billing and auditing. In order to simplify analysis and improve 
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the scalability of the HIP-multicast Model, the original large multicast tree can be decomposed of a center 
tree and several sub-trees logically. The logical architecture [7] [8] of the HIP-multicast model is shown 
in Fig. 1.  
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Fig. 1.   Logical Architecture of the HIP-Multicast Model 
In Fig. 1, the nodes in the multicast tree can be divided into three categories, endpoints, multicast 
routers and multicast agents [7] [8]. The different nodes play different roles in the multicast tree. So, 
according to the characters of HIP-multicast model, we propose a data key distribution protocol applied to 
HIP-multicast model. 
2.  A data key distribution protocol applied to HIP-multicast model
2.1.  Designing thought  of the new protocol 
 In HIP-multicast model, when a host wants to join a multicast group, the MA must authenticate its 
identity and distribute a data key to the host if it is necessary. However, because the original model does 
not give a data key distribution protocol, when the original model is applied to Internet, there may be the 
following problems:  
(1). There is not a valid mechanism to manage and distribute the data key for MAs and receivers. 
(2). There is not a relationship of secure constrains among the multicast agents. 
(3). When a MA is in charge of the key generation and management, its distributed architecture is not 
suit for the data key generation, management and updating directly. For example, the different data key 
may be distributed to same multicast group. 
In order to solve above problems, a new multicast member, who is called as the multicast key center 
(MKC), is introduced in the model. In generally, the MKC is served as by an elected MA or the multicast 
source MA, whose functions are as follows: 
(1). Instead of other multicast agents, the MKC is in charge of the unified data key generation, 
distribution, management and updating. 
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(2). It maintains the multicast routing information and audits the authority of the downstream MAs, 
and establishes a relationship of secure constrains among the multicast agents. These functions will 
descript in another paper. 
 The Architecture of HIP-multicast mode of introducing MKC is shown in fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2.  The Architecture of HIP-multicast mode of introducing MKC. 
Because the improved HIP-multicast model has a centralized-distributed structure, the general key 
distribution protocols [9] [10] [11] are not suit for it. So, according to the character of the improved 
model, we propose a new data key distribution protocol applied to the model, and it is referred to as 
DKDP-HIPM protocol. 
2.2. Symbol definition of the new protocol 
In order to descript the new protocol accurately, the essential symbols are defined as follows: 
Hi：the host whose number is i ; 
MAj：the multicast agent whose number is j ; 
MKC：the multicast key center ; 
HITi：the Identity Tag of Hi ; 
MITj：the Identity Tag of MAj ; 
GITm：the Identity Tag of the multicast group whose number is m ;
ri ：  the random number whose length is fixed, which can be used to avoid reply attacks; 
iH
K ：the authentication key between MAj and  Hi ; 
jMA
K ：the authentication key between MKC and MAj ;
Um：the data public key of distribution for the multicast group m ;
Km：the data private key of distribution for the multicast group m ;
2.3.  Description of the new protocol 
In DKDP-HIPM protocol, at first the multicast source designates a MA as a MKC for the group. When 
a host Hi wants to join a multicast group m, it will start the extended HIP Base Exchange in HIP-multicast 
model, and then the host starts the data key distribution protocol in Fig.3, whose steps are as follows:  
Initialization: After the extended HIP Base Exchange between Hi and MAj is successful, the host Hi
and MAj get the authentication key KHi. Moreover, after the extended HIP Base Exchange between MKC
and MAj is successful, the host MKC and MAj get the authentication key KMAj .
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Fig. 3.  The operating processes of a data key distribution protocol 
Step1: Hi generates a random number r1 and sends first message to MAj, whose format is 
1 1|| || ( || )iHi K mr HIT E r GIT .
Step2: MAj gets HITi and GITm, and then it generates a random number r2 and sends second message 
to MKC，whose format is 2 2|| ( || || )MA jK j mr E r MIT GIT .
Step3: After MKC discerns MAj, it generates a key pair (Um, Km) for group m (if MKC has had the Um
and Km, then it directly uses the key pair), and MKC reserves the Um for encrypting the multicast data. 
Then MKC adds Um and Km to third message and sends the massage to MAj , whose format is 
2( || || || )MAjK j m mE r MIT U K .
Step4: After MAj discerns MKC, it will get the group key pair Um and Km.  The Um is also reserved for 
MAj encrypting and decrypting the necessary data. Then MAj sends forth message to Hi, whose format is 
1( || )H iK mE r K .
Step5: Hi uses the new data key Km to encrypt r1, and sends fifth message Km(r1) to MAj. When MAj
gets r1，it will know Hi has gotten the data key successfully. The Km is reserved for Hi decrypting the 
multicast data. 
Step6: MAj uses the new data key Km to encrypt r2, and sends the message Km(r2) to MKC. When 
MKC gets r2，it will know Hi and MAj have gotten the data key successfully. The processes of the data 
key distribution are successful. 
Because MKC is in charge of the data key generation, management and updating, a data key database 
should be built in its memory. The structure of the data key database for group m is given as follows: 
Table 1. The structure table  of the data key database 
GITm Um Km
3.   Analysis of the protocol performance 
The DKDP-HIPM protocol can implement the data key distribution between MKC and MA or the 
multicast receiver well, when a multicast receiver or MA wants to join the HIP-multicast group and gets a 
data key. Next, we will analyze the performance of the protocol. 
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3.1. Security analysis 
For replay attack, an attacker may replay the first message to forge Hi, but his host is not the host of 
owning HITi, and he can not get Km . An attacker may also replay the second message to forge MAj, but 
his host is also not the host of owning MITj, and he can not get Km . If an attacker replays third or fourth 
message, then the r2 or r1 is not fresh, and the host MAj or Hi  does not believe it. So, the DKDP-HIPM 
protocol can avoid the reply attacks. 
For spoof attack, in DKDP-HIPM protocol, the important information is encrypted in each message, 
and an attacker does not know KHi and KMAj, so he can not spoof any valid messages.  
For Denial of service attack, the MAs discern the member host firstly. If this step is failed, they do not 
apply for the data key to the MKC. Even if attackers send a large mount of invalid message to a MA, there 
is not any endanger for MKC. In short, many MAs share the attacks instead of MKC.
In sum, the DKDP-HIPM protocol can avoid common attacks in Internet. 
3.2. Complexity analysis 
In Fig. 3, when a member host wants to get the data key of a multicast group, the new protocol needs 
six messages. In order to avoid the attacks and protect the protocol’s messages, the new protocol needs 
four symmetric encryptions and two asymmetric encryptions. They will affect the performance of the host 
to a certain extent. However, this effect only exists at the beginning of the multicast communication.  
The memory used to manage the data keys is not too many. Let G be the number of multicast groups, 
each data key is M bits in memory, the total memory of storing the data keys in the MKC and a MA are 
given as follows: 
                                          2MC MAMem Mem GM= =                                                                (1) 
The protocol does not provide specific encryption algorithms. Users should choose them according to 
the communication demand. For example, 3DES or AES may be used as its symmetric encryption 
algorithm. ECC or RSA may be used as its asymmetric encryption algorithm. The performance of 
protocol operating under different encryption algorithm is different. For comparing their performances 
under different encryption algorithm, we will use simulation to analyze them. 
3.3.  Simulation and analysis of the protocol 
The effects of the encryption and decryption to the protocol are mainly the consumption of time and 
memory usage of the host. Here, we use Matlab7.0.1 as simulation tool to analyze the time and memory 
usage of the protocol operating. The running environment consists of Intel(R) Core(TM) 2.8HZ CPU, 
2GB memory, Windows XP OS. The lengths of HIT, MIT, GIT, r1 and r2 are all 128bits. We use AES 
(the lengths of key are 128bits and 256 bits) as a symmetric encryption algorithms and RSA (p=311, 
q=337 and p=1283, q=1669) as an asymmetric encryption algorithms respectively. The running results 
show in Fig.4. 
From Fig. 4, we can see the fact that time (to ignore the time of transmission and forwarding) of 
protocol operating is tolerant in various encryption algorithms. Even if high security algorithms are used, 
the time of running protocol is less than four seconds. The memory usage of the protocol operating is also 
not too many. The high security algorithms might increase the memory usage, but they are not more than 
90MB yet. Therefore, the DKDP-HIPM protocol can be used in HIP-multicast model well. 
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(a) The time of the protocol operating                                       (b) Memory usage of the protocol operating 
Fig. 4.   The result of simulation of the protocol operating 
4. Conclusion 
The proposed DKDP-HIPM protocol adds a multicast key center MKC to HIP-multicast Model. The 
MKC can distribute, manage and updating the multicast data key of the multicast group validly. The new 
protocol can also avoid several possible attacks, including replaying, spoofing, and denial of service and 
so on. So it can enhance the performance of HIP-multicast model. The DKDP-HIPM protocol is 
practicable and secure. 
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